PATTERNS OF POWER · THE WARRANT

What the Conqueror Cannot Author

Five Ways to Seat a Man in a Country You Have Taken, Ordered by Where His Warrant Comes From — and Two Corrections the Archive Forces

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with Claude (Anthropic) · 2026

held as tested, not revealed

Preface: what this paper is

The collaboration, the five positions, and the promise that it stands alone.

This paper belongs to the Patterns of Power project and is a collaboration. The questions, the direction, the pattern-recognition and the final judgement are the author's; the synthesis, the drafting and the scholarly retrieval were done with Claude, Anthropic's model, with every load-bearing claim checked against a source before anything was built on it. The method is declared because it is a new way of making knowledge and ought to be visible rather than concealed.

The project asks one question of particular historical orders: how does a distribution of holdings taken by force become an arrangement that armed men will defend rather than contest? How does a warlord's camp become a country? This paper takes that question to the hardest case for it, which is the case where the man asking it is a foreigner who arrived last year.

It is built on six case studies produced earlier in this project under a related but distinct framework, and on two framework papers from the same body of work. It does not argue against them. It reads their evidence through the settlement framework, asks what that framework gains and loses, and enters two corrections to papers this project produced within the last few weeks.

The organising claim is short. A conqueror can supply force and cannot supply the one property that makes a title a title, which is that it was not made by a party to the contest. He is the most conspicuous possible party. So every arrangement he makes for seating a man over the country he has taken is an answer to a single question — *where do I get a warrant I did not write?* — and the record contains five answers. They can be told apart from installation documents, before anything is known about how the arrangement ended, and they predict how it ended.

The five, named here and defined in Part I: **forged**, where the conqueror is the sole author and pays for it every year; **imported**, where he moves a man who already carries a warrant the conqueror could not have made; **split**, where he takes the authorship of office and deliberately leaves the source of legitimacy in the hands of the conquered; **rented**, where he takes neither and leases both from a sovereign who can repossess them; and **titled**, where he changes the object — issuing deeds and bonds rather than offices, on the discovery that a piece of property requires nobody to believe in the man who holds it.

The paper works each on a case, sets them as a series, and then states the two corrections. The first is that **placement is not authorship**, which repairs an over-broad claim I made a short time ago about installed elites. The second is that the bias in the historical record is not random with respect to this project's subject but runs **systematically against the orders that resisted conquest best**, which is a sharper and more damaging version of a problem this project has already conceded.

The paper stands alone. No prior reading is assumed — not of this project, not of West African, North African, Levantine, East Asian or Inner Asian history, and not of any scholar named. Every borrowed idea is built from scratch in plain words before it is used.

One discipline governs throughout. Its subject is conquest, and among its cases are the largest slave state on earth kept intact by an abolitionist empire, a registration system worn on the body, a monastic order razed in eighteen months, and a sovereign deposed and exiled on the eve of a religious festival. To explain the machinery by which such things were done efficiently is not to soften them. This project states that obligation in the phrase *legibility is not pardon*, and discharges it in Part XII rather than in a clause.

The question

Two brothers, one room, and a man who claimed his title from the enemy he had just destroyed.

Two puzzles open this, and they point the same way.

The first. In March 1921, in one room at the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo, the same imperial power, in the same month, by the same men, placed two sons of the same family over two territories, on the same principle. Both were Hashemites, claiming descent from the Prophet. Both had served in the Arab Revolt. One was made king in Iraq; the other emir, and later king, in Transjordan.

One of those dynasties was machine-gunned in a Baghdad courtyard in 1958. The other is on its throne today.

That is as close to a controlled experiment as this subject offers, and the project's studies of the two have already run it. What it isolates is the question this paper is about, because it shows that *being installed by a foreign power* is not by itself the fatal condition it is usually taken to be. Something else varied.

The second puzzle is a document. On the twenty-first of March 1903, six days after the battle that ended the Sokoto Caliphate — the largest slave-holding state on earth, built a century earlier by a jihad against oppression and by 1903 simply the way the world was — the British High Commissioner Frederick Lugard stood in Sokoto and set out the terms of British rule.

He did not claim his title from Britain, or from the King, or from civilisation, or from the abolition in whose name the war had been sold to the British public. He claimed it from the men he had just defeated. The Fulani under Dan Fodio, he said, had conquered this country and taken by that conquest the right to rule, to tax, and to depose and create kings; they had now lost that right by defeat, and everything they had taken passed to the British. Therefore, he concluded, **every sultan and emir and principal officer of state would henceforth be appointed by the High Commissioner.**

Read the structure of that. Lugard does not argue the earlier conquest was illegitimate. He argues that it was **legitimate enough to have created a transferable title**, which he has now won. He needs the jihad to have been valid, because its validity is the only warrant available to him.

And in the same address he disclaims the thing he cannot have. Government, he says, will not interfere with the Muslim religion; mosques will be respected; the emirs

will keep their courts and their faith. That is not tolerance and it is not restraint. It is a man taking what he can take and announcing, in the same breath, what he knows he cannot.

The two puzzles are one question. A conqueror needs a warrant he did not write, because a warrant he wrote is worth precisely his own present strength and expires with it. Lugard bought his from a dead caliphate. Britain in Cairo bought its from the Prophet's genealogy. Elsewhere it was leased, or split, or simply forged and paid for in force forever. This paper is an attempt to lay the available answers out in order.

The framework, compressed

Possession, ownership, and why the strongest man cannot write his own title.

Everything below rests on a distinction ordinary speech collapses, and it must be kept separated.

Possession is what force holds now. Nobody presently able to take a thing is taking it. Possession is entirely present-tense and it expires exactly when the capacity sustaining it expires — at illness, at absence, at distraction, and completely at death.

Ownership is a claim about the future and about other people: that this will be mine tomorrow while I sleep, mine next season while I am away, and that when I die you will treat my son as its holder. Ownership is not a relation between a person and a thing. It is a structure of expectations about how other people will behave toward a thing across time, including across my absence and my death.

Force is sovereign over the first and impotent over the second. A sword takes a field today; it cannot promise the field next spring, still less that a boy will hold it. **The part of a holding that force cannot reach is exactly the part that distinguishes ownership from possession, and it must therefore be manufactured out of something that is not force.** Read "a holding" broadly: an office, an emirate, a chieftaincy, a throne, a right to labour, a deed.

Why armed men cannot settle unaided

Everybody in a world of armed men would prefer a settlement, and that fact explains nothing, because the question is why a settlement holds at the moment when breaking it would pay. The political scientist James Fearon set out the difficulty in 1995: nobody can bind their future self, so a bargain struck at today's balance of strength will be renegotiated at tomorrow's, and striking first is frequently correct even for a party who sincerely wants peace.

The decision that governs is not the aggressor's but the **bystanders'**. Each asks whether this is his quarrel, and absent a common ground of title the honest answer is no — spending his men on a neighbour's defence buys casualties and an enemy, and if he intervenes and the others do not, he has made himself the next target while they husbanded their strength. So every bystander waits, each knows the others are reasoning identically, and that shared expectation of inaction is what makes the original

seizure safe. **Warlordism is a coordination failure among the men who might have punished it, not a moral failure.**

The anchor, and the prohibition this paper is about

Now suppose every holding derives its rightfulness from one source. The bystander's arithmetic inverts: letting this seizure stand establishes that holdings may be taken, which is a fact about *his* holding. Intervention becomes self-defence at one remove, and he can predict the others are computing the same thing, so acting does not expose him.

Call that source the **anchor**. The economist Barry Weingast formalised the same structure in 1997 for the relation between a ruler and his subjects, arguing that a sovereign needs only one group's acquiescence, so that divided subjects are transgressed at will and united subjects are not, and that a shared standard works by telling everyone what counts as a transgression. This project applies it horizontally, among armed peers.

From which the prohibition that organises this paper:

> ***A party competing for the spoils cannot be the author of who gets them.*** *A title granted by a competitor is not a title; it is a forecast about that competitor's health.*

And the danger is not primarily that a strong man breaks the rule. Breaking is legible and the coalition is trained to punish it. The danger is that he *changes* it, because rule-change does not trigger the coalition at all. So the anchor must be **unforgeable by the current claimants** — which is weaker than requiring it to be supernatural, since descent, a closed canon and a randomised procedure all sit inside the human world and are equally unavailable to a man with an army.

An anchor also does not read itself. Somebody says what it requires: which lineage descends from whom, which appointment is valid, which prohibition applies. This project calls them the **interpreter class**, and a recent paper in it established that they do two separable jobs. The **vertical** job is telling the apex *no*, which requires that the apex cannot revoke their standing. The **horizontal** job is making every armed man's title checkable against one source, which requires only that they be *singular*. Capture destroys the first almost at once and leaves the second untouched — which is why thoroughly servile clergies are compatible with centuries of stability.

The conqueror's specific problem

Now put a foreigner at the top of that structure and the prohibition bites in a particular way.

He has force, and force is adequate to possession. What he needs, if the arrangement is to survive him, is a warrant for the men he seats — a reason why a district head's authority persists when the district officer is at the coast, and why the man's son inherits it. And he is the least eligible author in the country, because he is not merely a party to the contest; he is the party who arrived with the artillery.

He therefore has to obtain a warrant he did not write. There are five ways, and they exhaust what the record shows.

Part I — The five seats

Defined so they can be told apart from installation documents.

Each position is defined by a single question that can be answered from the paperwork of the installation itself, before anything is known about the outcome: **who made the warrant of the man being seated?**

Forged. The conqueror is the sole author. He selects a man, confers an office that did not previously exist or existed in a different form, and there is no source of the man's standing other than the conqueror's own decision and the force behind it. Tell: the office is new, or the title is invented, and the man's prior standing in his own society is low or negative.

Imported. The conqueror moves a man who already carries a warrant issued elsewhere and unavailable to the conqueror — descent from a sacred lineage, standing in a religious tradition, a reputation earned in another country's war. The conqueror *places* him and does not *author* him. Tell: the warrant is portable, predates the conquest, and could not have been conferred by the sponsor at any price.

Split. The conqueror takes the authorship of office and deliberately leaves the source of legitimacy with the conquered — announcing, usually explicitly, that he appoints and that he will not touch the religion. Tell: two statements in the same document, one claiming the power of appointment and one renouncing interference in the sacred.

Rented. The conqueror takes neither. He leaves an existing sovereign in place holding both the anchor and the authorship, and inserts himself as the machinery through which that sovereign's authority is exercised, usually by controlling the signature. Tell: the conqueror's own instruments are issued in the subject sovereign's name and require his seal.

Titled. The conqueror changes the object. Rather than seating men in offices, he issues property — surveyed land, registered deeds, government securities — to a class he thereby creates. Tell: the first great expense of the administration is a cadastral survey rather than a tax, and the instrument binding the new elite is a financial one.

Two notes before the cases.

The scale is about **issuance, not sentiment**. An imported apex may be entirely dependent in practice; a rented sovereign may be a willing collaborator. What is being

scored is where the warrant came from, because that determines what happens when the sponsor's force is withdrawn or turned against him.

And the positions are not a ladder of cynicism. They are a menu set by circumstance. A conqueror who finds a caliphate cannot rent a sultan he does not have; a conqueror who finds ridges and councils cannot split an authorship that was never pooled. **Which seat a conqueror uses is determined mostly by what the country he entered had already built**, which is the finding of an earlier paper in this project and the premise of this one.

Part II — Forged: the chair nobody knelt to

Kenya, and the structural reason a manufactured chief must be a disgraced man.

Begin at the bottom of the scale, because it establishes what the other four are avoiding.

When the British came onto the highlands east of Lake Victoria at the turn of the twentieth century they looked for the counterpart every conqueror knows how to handle — the king to depose or keep, the court to occupy, the tax machine to inherit — and found none of it. The Kikuyu order had no paramount chief, no capital, no treasury and no standing army. Authority was entirely real and it was everywhere at once: in the lineage trustee whose standing rested on seniority and confidence and passed to no son by right, in the councils of circumcised elders who were legislature and court and ritual authority together, and in a whole ruling generation that handed its authority to the next, entire, on a roughly thirty-year cycle. There was nowhere to send an announcement.

So the British made a chair, and the sequence by which they filled it is the sharpest short passage in this project's colonial material.

The company first dealt with **Waiyaki wa Hinga**, a wealthy frontier elder with a fortified homestead, and mistook a prominent big-man for a sovereign, styling him paramount chief of the Kikuyu — a rank that did not exist. Relations soured; in 1892, after a failed punitive expedition and a quarrel with a company officer, Waiyaki was struck down, arrested and sent under guard toward the coast for trial. He never arrived. The first man Britain mistook for the Kikuyu's chief died in its custody in chains.

Over that grave the colony raised its actual instrument, and he was the old order's castoff. **Kinyanjui wa Gathirimu** had been disowned by his own lineage — a wayward younger man whose conduct had cost his relatives too much in compensation — and had attached himself to Waiyaki as a *njaguti*, a servant, before hiring on to the company as a porter. When his master died, the servant made himself useful to the men who had killed him: guide, intelligence agent, garrison supplier, leader of punitive columns against Kikuyu who resisted. From 1902 he was selling Kiambu land to the first white settlers; in 1908 he was made a senior chief; after the war he became the only man ever to hold the invented title of paramount chief of the Kikuyu; he took the King's Medal

for Chiefs in 1922 and was consulted on the appointment of other chiefs until his death in 1929.

Why the discard is the correct choice

The earlier study's finding on this is exactly right and the framework can restate it as a theorem. **A forged chair must be filled by someone the old order does not command**, because a man the old order still holds will answer to it and not to the forger. And the readiest such man is precisely the one the old order has cast out, who owes it nothing and will take from the newcomer the standing his own people denied him.

The disowned servant is not an unlucky choice of collaborator. He is the structurally correct one, and the pattern should be expected wherever a chair is forged.

What it costs, and the object that measures it

And the price is stated in a sentence the framework could have written: **Kinyanjui was obeyed because the British were obeyed.** Remove the British and there was no reason for any Kikuyu to defer to Waiyaki's disgraced servant.

That is the prohibition arriving on schedule. Kinyanjui's warrant had exactly one author; the author was the most conspicuous party to the contest; therefore the warrant was worth the author's present strength and nothing more, and it had to be renewed in force every year for sixty.

The colony's own instruments measure the bill. A hut tax from 1901 and a poll tax from 1910, payable in coin obtainable only by working for a European, with the governor stating plainly that taxation was the only possible method of compelling a man to leave his reserve and seek work. A criminal offence, from 1906, for breaking a labour contract. And the *kipande* — under the Native Registration Ordinance of 1915, enforced from 1919, every African male of sixteen fingerprinted and issued a certificate in a small copper container worn by law on a chain at his neck, holding his description, his tribe and his employers' remarks on his conduct; more than a million issued by 1932; settlers never subject to it.

Read that object structurally and it names the missing warrant exactly. **It is a portable file** — the externalised memory an order must carry because it cannot trust a man to stay where he is wanted or to hold himself there by his own conviction. An order whose seating had taken would not need it, because the believed subject keeps his own account and polices himself for free. The tag weighs precisely what a warrant would have carried for nothing.

And the ruling race ran the confirming experiment without meaning to. For three decades the tag hung on African necks only. In the late 1940s the Colonial Office moved to make registration universal, and the settlers rose against it — a device that had been ordinary administrative convenience while it hung on somebody else became, the instant the rulers were asked to submit to it, an intolerable affront. **A thing that is a badge when worn by the ruled and an outrage when asked of the rulers has been identified by the rulers' own recoil.**

Part III — Imported: placement is not authorship

Two brothers, one principle, opposite endings — and the competing explanation stated at full strength.

Now the position that corrects a claim I made too broadly a short time ago.

In *No Empty Ground* I wrote that an author who is a party to the contest cannot confer a title that outlives him, and I used Kinyanjui as the case. That is right about Kinyanjui and wrong as a general statement about installed elites, and the Hashemite pair shows why.

In March 1921 at Cairo, Britain seated Faisal in Iraq and, in the same conference and by the same men, recognised his brother Abdullah in Transjordan. Both carried the same warrant: **Sharifian descent** — the claim of lineage from the Prophet, held by the family that had held the guardianship of Mecca — together with standing earned in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans.

Notice what that warrant is, from Britain's side. It is not merely one Britain did not confer. It is one Britain **could not have conferred at any price**, in the same way that no amount of conquest could make a man a descendant of Genghis Khan or a Solomonid or a sharif. Britain moved these men. Britain did not make them. And a warrant the sponsor cannot make is not worth the sponsor's present strength, because it did not come from there.

That is the distinction the corpus needed and the Transjordan study states it precisely: **importation and illegitimacy are separate variables.** An imported apex carrying a portable robe his sponsor neither wrote nor owned can root where a forged chieftaincy cannot. Kinyanjui had the rifle. Abdullah had a genealogy older than Britain.

So the corrected formulation is:

> ***Placement is not authorship.*** *A sponsor may install a man without authoring him, provided the man arrives carrying a warrant the sponsor could not have issued. What the prohibition forbids is a title whose only source is a party to the contest, and an imported apex is not that, however dependent he is in practice.*

The competing explanation, which must not be flattened

Here the paper has to be careful, because the case pair does not license the strong reading and the source study is explicit about it.

Transjordan's study went in holding that poverty explained the survival — a state with nothing worth stealing is a state nobody bothers to seize — and the evidence corrected that intuition into a sharper mechanism. Poor states are overthrown constantly. What protected this one was the *form its solvency took*. **A rent is attached to the ground and transfers to whoever takes the wellhead; a subsidy is attached to a person the payer chooses**, so that seizing Amman meant inheriting a bankruptcy rather than acquiring an income. Rents are seizable. Subsidies are not.

That is a complete alternative explanation of why the Transjordanian arrangement was not overthrown, and it has nothing to do with descent from the Prophet. Iraq, meanwhile, carried two aggravating variables Transjordan lacked: a point-resource that made the state a prize worth seizing, and a welded fracture of Sunni, Shia and Kurd that no formation could close.

So the honest statement of what the pair establishes is narrower than the headline, and worth stating in the paper's own voice rather than buried:

The pair establishes that an imported warrant is compatible with rooting, and refutes the claim that an installed apex is brittle merely because it was installed. It does not establish that the warrant caused the survival. Sharifian descent was constant across both brothers and the outcomes differed, which means the warrant cannot be the whole cause of either. What the warrant plausibly did was make rooting *possible*; the subsidy structure and the demographic homogeneity plausibly did the rest. A framework that claimed more than that from two cases would be doing what this project exists to avoid.

Part IV — Split: taking the appointment and leaving the god

Sokoto, 1903, and the discovery that indirect rule makes an emirate absolute.

The third position is the one the archive states most explicitly, because the man performing it announced both halves of it aloud in a single speech, and the speech survives.

What was there

The Sokoto Caliphate was founded by a jihad launched in 1804 by Usman dan Fodio against rulers its leaders held to be oppressive and insufficiently Muslim. By 1903 it was a century old, ran across what is now northern Nigeria as a confederation of emirates under a caliph at Sokoto, and had become — in the phrase this project uses for a build that has taken — simply the way the world was. It had a treasury, a cavalry arm, an Islamic judiciary of *alkalis* applying Maliki law, a scholarly class, and a very large population held in slavery.

It was also, in the terms of this project, an order with everything a conqueror wants: a pooled apex, a graded administrative hierarchy, a functioning revenue system, and a population that obeyed it without needing to be held down.

The two sentences

Six days after the battle, Lugard set out the terms. He disposed of the existing treaties by making their victims responsible for their death — the old treaties are dead, he said, you have killed them — and then stated his title, which he took not from Britain but from Dan Fodio: the Fulani had conquered the country and taken by conquest the right to rule, to tax, and to depose and create kings; they had lost that right by defeat; it now passed to the British. And therefore every sultan, emir and principal officer of state would be appointed by the High Commissioner.

That is the first half: **the authorship of every office in the country, claimed explicitly, and claimed as inherited from the previous conqueror.**

Then the second half, in the same address and equally unqualified. Government would in no way interfere with the Muslim religion; all men were free to worship as

they pleased; mosques and prayer places would be treated with respect. The emirs would keep their courts and their revenues, subject to a share and to the Resident's review; the *alkalis* would hold the law courts as before.

That is not tolerance. It is a man announcing the boundary of what he can take. **Lugard could not become caliph, could not acquire Islamic learning, and could not confer or withhold the standing of a scholar.** The anchor of the Sokoto order was unavailable to him at any price — so he left it entirely alone, and took the one thing he could take, which was the power to say who sat in the offices the anchor legitimated.

What the split produced

Now run the framework's two functions over the result, and the outcome is the paper's cleanest confirmation of a finding this project made only weeks ago on entirely different material.

The horizontal function survived intact. Every emirate in the country continued to derive its standing from one place, and after 1903 that place was singular in a way it had not quite been before: the High Commissioner. A district head's authority remained checkable against a single source, so the coordination that makes an order cheap to run continued. Northern Nigeria was administered at roughly one British officer per hundred thousand people — against about one per seventy thousand in the south, where no such apparatus had been inherited — and that ratio is the horizontal function's price tag.

The vertical function was destroyed, and its destruction was the by-product nobody advertised. Before 1903, an emir was constrained from several directions at once: by the caliph above him, who could depose; by the scholarly class whose reading of the law he could not simply overrule; by rival lineages with their own claims; by the standing possibility of revolt. The study's finding on this is stated better than I would state it: **the hands that could check an emir fell from five to one, and the one was in London and cared about the tax receipts. Indirect rule did not preserve the emirate; it made it absolute.**

That is capture removing restraint while leaving coordination untouched, arrived at independently, in a case neither of this project's recent papers examined. It is also the mechanism by which a conquest can be described, with technical accuracy, as having *preserved* an institution while having in fact removed every constraint that institution had ever operated under.

And the cost, which fell where the framework says it does

Two consequences follow and both are in the record.

The first is that the settlement was made with the men who held the country and not with the people in it. The emirs kept their thrones, their courts and their revenues; the abolition in whose name the British public had been told the war was fought was implemented as a prohibition on *buying and selling* slaves while explicitly declining to interfere in existing domestic relations. Slaves who wished to be free bought their own freedom, in numbers running to six figures, at prices their owners set. The study's title for that module is the whole finding: what the taxpayer would not buy twice.

The second is that the people who revolted against the arrangement were not the ones the British expected. The study records the rising at Satiru in March 1906 with the observation that **the only people Britain had to police were the only people who had believed Britain** — the rural population who had taken the promise of relief seriously, rather than the aristocracy who had been bought.

Part V — Rented: the keystone that could be repossessed

Morocco, and the one crack in an otherwise total capture.

The fourth position takes neither the anchor nor the authorship, and is the cheapest and gentlest of the five, and has exactly one failure mode, which is fatal and cannot be repaired.

What was rented

The Alaouite sultan of Morocco in 1912 held two things a French official could not obtain. He was *amir al-mu'minin*, Commander of the Faithful — a title claimed in the Maghreb since the Marinids — and his family's claim rested additionally on **sharifian descent**, lineage from the Prophet through his grandson Hasan. And he held office by *bay'a*, an oath of allegiance drafted by religious scholars and subscribed by the notables of the community — the *shurafa*, the heads of the Sufi lodges, the military commanders, the leading merchants, the masters of the crafts — who by that act conferred legitimacy and bound themselves to obedience, while the sultan undertook in return to safeguard religion, security, public order, justice and honour.

Note what that is: a contract with named parties and stated obligations, and the constitutional instrument of the country. It is not a vague aura of reverence. It is a document with signatories.

The French protectorate left it standing and ran its administration through it. Decrees were issued in the sultan's name and required his seal.

The two things renting buys

The study's own summary of what Morocco added to this project names both, and both are worth carrying into the framework.

The robe can be rented rather than woven — a conqueror may lease the belief already installed on a population instead of building his own, which is cheaper because the belief is already believed.

And **the cost column can be rented too.** This is the sharper half. Where the sultan's authority is a religious duty, defiance of the coloniser presents itself to the

ordinary subject as defiance of a sovereign he is obliged to obey — so the compliance is priced by the subject's own community, at no cost whatever to the conqueror. The coloniser gets the deterrence for free because somebody else is administering it.

The one crack

And the exposure is the same fact seen from the other side: **an order that rents its keystone cannot defend its keystone.** The conqueror's ordinary instruments — deposition, exile, replacement — are precisely the instruments that destroy the trust which made the thing worth renting.

The demonstration is dated. By 1950 Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef had aligned with the nationalists and begun **withholding his seal** from decrees he opposed — using the one power the arrangement had left in Moroccan hands, the power of legitimacy, against the arrangement itself. On 20 August 1953 the French, working with the great caid Thami El Glaoui, deposed and exiled him, first to Corsica and in January 1954 to Madagascar, and installed a cousin, Mohammed Ben Aarafa, in his place.

It did not work for a day. The substitute was regarded as a usurper; violence spread; in August 1955 a rising around Oued Zem killed European settlers; El Glaoui himself eventually rallied to the exile's cause, and on 16 November 1955 Mohammed ben Youssef returned to enormous crowds. Independence followed within months.

Two features of that sequence matter for the framework.

The first is that the anchor acted. This project has recorded one previous instance of an anchor that legitimates by a positive act of appointment retaining latent agency and being reclaimed by its source — the Japanese emperor, powerless for two and a half centuries, withdrawing the mandate at the Meiji Restoration. Morocco is the same move in the twentieth century, performed by withholding a signature. An anchor whose consent is required for each act, rather than conferred once and forever, is an anchor that can go on strike.

The second is that France had to reinstate the very sovereign it had destroyed, because it had spent forty years grinding away every other point of contestability and had therefore consumed every collaborator but him. That is the general law of the rented position: the tenant may evict the landlord, and then discovers there is nowhere else to live.

Part VI — Titled: the elite that requires no belief

Taiwan, and the discovery that a deed needs nobody's deference.

The fifth position is the most consequential and the least discussed, because it is the one that escapes the problem rather than solving it.

When Japan took Taiwan in 1895 it found a country whose coordination had never pooled into an apex a stranger could enter. Authority sat at the level of the lineage and the market town, in a few dozen places at once, held by families whose standing came from below and beside them — armed strongmen the Qing empire had recognised, licensed and occasionally punished rather than commanded. And land on the western plain ran on a doubled tenure in which more than one party held a claim on the same field.

By the scale of this paper, Japan was in the position that produced Kinyanjui: there was no seat to take. But it did not forge a chief. It did something else.

The characteristic first expense of capturing a revenue system is not a tax but a survey, and the survey is the more intrusive instrument, because a levy touches a man once a year and a register decides what he owns. Japan surveyed, resolved the doubled tenure, compensated the holders it extinguished — and thereby, in the same motion, manufactured a class of proprietors whose title came from the new administration's register.

And here is the finding that makes this a distinct position rather than a variant of forging:

> ***A manufactured proprietor is not brittle in the way a forged chief is, because a title deed requires nobody to believe in the man who holds it.***

Kinyanjui needed deference and could not get it. A landowner does not need deference. His holding is enforced against *things* and against trespassers, by a registry and a court, and it works perfectly well in a population that despises him. The warrant problem — that a conqueror cannot author a title requiring other people's belief — is not solved here. It is **sidestepped, by shifting to a form of title that requires no belief at all.**

And the study names the instrument that binds such a class most tightly, which is not land but a government security: **a bondholder cannot detest a government without detesting his own holdings.** A man's opinion of the regime becomes an opinion about the value of his own portfolio, which is the cheapest loyalty ever devised, because it requires no ceremony, no clergy, no formation and no consent.

This is the position modern states converged on, and it is worth pausing on why. Property is the one form of title whose enforcement runs against objects rather than through deference, so it is the one form an outsider can issue without needing an interpreter, a lineage or a god. This project's earlier work on the relocation of English property title into nature — labour-mixing, an author who is nobody — is the same discovery made from inside a settled order rather than from the deck of a conquering one.

The caution belongs with it. A titled elite is durable and it is not a settlement. It secures holdings and does not coordinate the armed; it produces a class with an interest in the register's continuity and no shared ground of rightfulness at all. Which is a configuration this project has met before in Hawaii and in Buganda after 1900 — devotion in one place, authorship in another — and the framework's expectation is that such an order runs smoothly until it is asked a question the register cannot answer.

Part VII — The move above the scale: setting the distance by decree

Qianlong, 1758, and a sentence that cost nothing and worked for a hundred and fifty years.

Before the series is drawn together, one case belongs beside it that is not a colonial seating at all, because it shows the same variable being operated on from outside — deliberately, cheaply, and with a precision nothing else in the archive matches.

The configuration that was removed

The supreme religious authority of the Khalkha Mongols was the **Jebtsundamba Khutuktu**, an office filled by reincarnation: on the holder's death a search is conducted by clerics and the child identified is confirmed as the same person returned.

The first two Jebtsundambas were Mongol princes of the highest nobility and direct descendants of Chinggis Khan; the first was the son of a Tusheet Khan. Hold that configuration in view and see what it means in this framework's terms. **The supreme religious authority of the Khalkha and their supreme dynastic legitimacy could recur in one person, and had** — which is to say Mongolia was capable of producing, in a single body, a claimant whom the herdsmen and the princes would both have been obliged to obey.

That is the fused position at its most dangerous to an outside power: an interpreter who is also the highest possible claimant, in a society where descent from Chinggis is the one warrant no conquest can confer.

The sentence

In 1756 a Khalkha prince raised a rebellion; it drew little support and was crushed, and its trigger had been the execution of a brother of the second Jebtsundamba — a man of the Chinggisid line. In 1758 the second Jebtsundamba died, and the Qianlong emperor decreed that **all future incarnations of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu were to be found among the population of Tibet.**

Every Jebtsundamba from the third to the eighth was a Tibetan.

Consider what that instrument is. It is not a conquest, not a purge, not a garrison. It does not touch the doctrine, the monasteries, the liturgy or the office's authority — all

of which continue exactly as before. It changes one administrative parameter: **the catchment from which the holder may be drawn.** And it thereby guarantees, permanently, that the country's supreme legitimating authority can never again be one of its own dynasts.

The source study's own summary of what this adds is exact: the family of solutions that keeps an elite from hardening into rivals has a cheap variant, available wherever an interpreter class is headed by an office filled **by procedure rather than by birth**, because a procedure has a rule about where the next holder comes from, and a rule can be edited by decree. It generated no army, no payroll and no barracks. It cost a sentence.

Two consequences for this framework

The first is that credential distance can be set by a third party. This project's recent work treats the distance between an interpreter's warrant and the men competing as a feature of an order — inherited, structural, and largely given. Qianlong shows it as an *instrument*. He made the Mongol interpreter foreign by decree, for the same reason the Ethiopian emperors suffered a church head appointed from Alexandria: foreignness makes the office uncapturable. The difference is that Ethiopia's was a constraint on the emperor and Mongolia's was a weapon aimed at the princes. **Foreignness of the credential is not only a limit on rulers. It is something a sufficiently placed ruler will impose on his subjects.**

And it exposes a vulnerability the earlier paper did not name. An office filled by **procedure** looks maximally unforgeable — nobody can arrange to be a reincarnation — and is in fact the most editable kind there is, because it has a written rule about eligibility and rules can be amended by whoever controls the paperwork. A bloodline has no eligibility rule to edit; you either descend or you do not. **Procedure is unforgeable at the level of the individual and capturable at the level of the rule**, which is a distinction the corpus has been missing.

The second is the recursion, on a clock. By 1911, when the Khalkha nobles and high lamas broke with Beijing, they raised to the throne the Tibetan whose foreignness had been the previous conqueror's design — and did not regard themselves as installing a stranger. They regarded themselves as restoring a Mongol state. A hundred and fifty years is apparently sufficient for an imposed constraint to become the furniture of reality, and to be defended as native by the descendants of the people it was imposed on.

Part VIII — The series

Five answers to one question, and what each of them costs.

Set the five together and they are not five arrangements but one problem solved five ways.

The problem. A conqueror can supply force, and force is adequate to possession and useless for ownership. What he needs is a warrant for the men he seats — a reason their authority persists across his absence and their death — and he is the least eligible author in the country, because he is the party who arrived with the artillery.

Forged. He does not obtain one. He substitutes his own force for a warrant, seats a man the old order has cast out because that is the only man the old order does not still command, and pays the difference every year in tax pressure, registration, criminal labour law and garrison. *Kenya.* The bill is visible in the object hung at the throat.

Imported. He moves a man who already holds a warrant issued somewhere he cannot reach. He places without authoring, and the seated man can root, because the thing that legitimates him did not come from the sponsor and does not lapse with the sponsor. *Transjordan.* Cost: the imported man's interests are his own, and his warrant works as well against the sponsor as for him.

Split. He takes the authorship of office and leaves the anchor untouched, usually announcing both in the same document because the second announcement is what makes the first tolerable. *Northern Nigeria.* Cost: cheapest administration in the record and the destruction of every constraint the seated men had ever operated under — indirect rule producing not a preserved emirate but an absolute one.

Rented. He takes neither, leaves an existing sovereign holding both, and inserts himself as the machinery through which the sovereign acts. *Morocco.* Cheapest and gentlest of all, and it has one unfixable exposure, because the instruments that would defend the arrangement are the instruments that destroy the trust the arrangement runs on.

Titled. He changes the object, issuing surveyed deeds and government securities rather than offices, and manufactures a class whose holdings need nobody's deference at all. *Taiwan.* Cost, or rather the thing it is not: it secures property and does not coordinate the armed, and an order held together this way has no shared ground of rightfulness to appeal to when it needs one.

The ordering principle

The positions sort on one line, and the line is the distance between the warrant's issuer and the conqueror.

At one end the conqueror is the issuer, and the warrant is worth his present strength — which is to say it is not a warrant, and the arrangement is possession with a gazette notice. At the other end the issuer is a sovereign the conqueror cannot touch, and the conqueror holds nothing but a tenancy. The three positions between are ways of getting some of the benefit of the far end without accepting all of its exposure: import the man but not the institution; take the appointment but not the god; take neither and lease both.

And one position steps off the line entirely, which is why it is the modern one. **The titled position does not obtain a warrant; it changes the subject from persons to things**, and property is the one kind of title whose enforcement runs against objects rather than through anybody's belief. It is the only escape the record contains from a problem that otherwise has no solution — and what it escapes with is not a settlement among armed men but a register.

Part IX — Two corrections, and one thing the archive adds

What this material does to papers this project produced in the last few weeks.

Correction one: placement is not authorship

In *No Empty Ground* I wrote that a forged chair rests on nothing but the force behind it, that its occupant is obeyed only because the sponsor is obeyed, and that an author who is a party to the contest cannot confer a title that outlives him. Kinyanjui was the case and the reading of him stands.

What I then did, and should not have, was let that stand as a general statement about **installed** elites. It is not. The Hashemite pair shows that a sponsor can place a man without authoring him, and that the resulting seat can root — because the warrant was issued by a lineage no European power could confer and none could revoke.

The corrected proposition, entered here and to be carried forward:

> *The prohibition forbids a title whose **only** source is a party to the contest. An installed apex carrying a portable warrant the sponsor could not have issued does not fall under it, however dependent that apex is in practice. **Forged and imported are different positions and only the first is brittle by construction.***

And with the qualification Part III insists on: the pair establishes compatibility, not causation. Sharifian descent was constant across two brothers with opposite outcomes, so it cannot be the whole cause of either, and the subsidy-not-rent mechanism is a complete alternative account of the survival that owes nothing to the warrant.

Correction two: the archive's bias runs against the resilient

The Shape of the Sieve argued that this project reads a survivorship record — that the orders in the corpus are the ones that lasted long enough to build archives, and that regularities found in them may be facts about what gets written down. The remedy proposed was to look for failures in the archives of literate neighbours.

The archive contains a framework paper on headless orders that states the same problem in a form I did not reach, and the form is worse.

The argument there runs: coordination can be concentrated into a seizable apex or diffused across un-seizable parts, and the choice is a trade-off with no free option. Concentration buys reach and capacity at the price of a fatal address; diffusion buys resilience against capture at the price of reach. And then the turn — **the record itself is a technology of the apex.** Writing, archives and chronicles require the surplus, the scribes and the bureaucracy that only concentration produces. So the diffuse orders were largely oral, left few records of their own, and survive mostly in what the concentrated states wrote about them, which was written as their conquest required them to be seen.

Which means the bias is not random with respect to this project's subject. **The very property that makes an order resistant to conquest — its refusal of the apex that produces scribes — is the property that guarantees it cannot tell its own story.** The record systematically under-represents exactly the configuration the framework is most interested in, and when it does represent it, does so in the vocabulary of the power that spent the most to overcome it.

That is a sharper statement than the one I made and it should replace it. Survivorship in this field is not a lottery weighted toward the lucky. It is a filter weighted against the un-decapitatable.

What the archive adds: the second half of the recurrence answer

This project has answered the question *why do unconnected orders converge* with **selection** — positions afford few good moves, the attempts that found none dissolved and left nothing, and the record is the residue.

A framework paper in the archive supplies the other half, and both are needed. Position, it argues, narrows not only the menu of good solutions but the field of *visible* ones. A conqueror standing over a running kingdom is handed the co-optation solution by his position; what his position never hands him is the long run of the choice, because the long run lives in other men's histories, which are not in his field. And the subject elite is caught in the same narrowness from the other side: the Ganda chief deciding whether to convert cannot consult the Persian noble to learn how protected status for a priestly class curdled over three centuries, because that man is a stranger across an ocean and a millennium.

The formulation is the best single line in the archive on this question: **history rhymes because the men who make it cannot see far enough to break the rhyme.**

Selection explains what survives to be observed. The horizon limit explains why nobody learns and the pattern therefore keeps recurring rather than being corrected out of existence. A framework carrying only the first has an account of the sample and no account of the behaviour.

And a vulnerability in the credential scale

Part VII exposed something *The Distance to the Sword* did not name. That paper treated a warrant's unforgeability as a property of its type, and ranked procedures alongside bloodlines and closed canons as things a claimant cannot fake.

Qianlong's decree shows the ranking is wrong in a specific way. **A procedure is unforgeable at the level of the individual and capturable at the level of the rule.** Nobody can arrange to be a reincarnation; but the reincarnation search has a written rule about eligibility, and a rule has an author, and whoever controls the paperwork can amend it. A bloodline has no eligibility rule to edit — you either descend or you do not — which makes it *less* editable than a procedure despite being, in the ordinary sense, a cruder instrument.

That belongs in the scale as a stated qualification: procedural credentials are the most editable of the unforgeable kinds, and the edit is made not against the office but against its catchment.

Part X — Predictions

Stated so that they can fail.

P1 — Forged chairs are staffed from the prior order's outcasts. Where a conquering power manufactures an intermediary office, the men raised to it should disproportionately be persons the prior order had marginalised, disinherited or expelled, and the arrangement should require continuous external force. *Falsified if* forged offices are typically filled from the prior order's established authorities and hold without continuing sponsor force.

P2 — Imported apexes root and forged ones do not. Installed rulers carrying a warrant the sponsor could not have issued should survive the sponsor's departure at a markedly higher rate than installed rulers whose only warrant is the sponsor's decision. *Falsified if* survival rates are comparable, or if imported warrants confer no advantage once resource structure and demography are controlled for.

P3 — The split position is announced in one document. Where a conqueror takes the appointment and leaves the anchor, both should appear in the same founding instrument, because the renunciation is what makes the claim tolerable. *Falsified if* such conquests typically claim appointment without any corresponding public renunciation.

P4 — Split rule removes restraint and is mistaken for preservation. Where a foreign power takes the authorship of native offices, the constraints operating on the holders of those offices should fall sharply and quickly, while coordination and administrative cheapness are maintained or improved — producing an institution more absolute than the one it replaced, described in the record as preserved. *Falsified if* the constraints on such office-holders survive the transfer of appointment.

P5 — A rented keystone cannot be defended. Where a conquering power leases an existing sovereign's legitimacy, any attempt to remove or replace that sovereign should fail and should accelerate the order's collapse, because the instruments of removal destroy the asset. *Falsified if* colonial powers routinely depose leased sovereigns and install substitutes who are accepted.

P6 — Titled elites outlast forged ones and do not coordinate. Elites manufactured by registry and security should prove markedly more durable than manufactured office-holders, should be indifferent to popular deference, and should show no capacity to act as a settlement among armed men when the register is

challenged. *Falsified if* manufactured proprietors prove as brittle as forged chiefs, or if they demonstrably supply the coordination function.

P7 — Procedural credentials are captured at the catchment. Where an outside power moves against an interpreter class whose office is filled by procedure, the intervention should take the form of an edit to the eligibility rule rather than an attack on the doctrine or the institution, and should be markedly cheaper than interventions against birth-filled offices. *Falsified if* powers facing procedural interpreter classes attack doctrine or personnel in preference to catchment.

And the architecture fails as a whole if this is found: **a conqueror who durably seated men on a warrant of his own manufacture, over an unwilling population, without continuous coercive expenditure, and whose seating survived the withdrawal of his force.** That is the case this paper says cannot exist, and the colonial record is where to look for it because it is the record with the paperwork.

Part XI — Where this is weak

Nine problems, three of which reach the argument's foundations.

The five positions are post hoc. They were derived by reading six studies that had already been written, and the boundaries between them were drawn where the cases fell. A scale constructed that way will always fit the cases that constructed it. What would count is the scale applied, blind, to seatings it has never seen.

Every case comes from this project, built under a different framework. The six studies were produced with a distinct apparatus — floor, robe, settlement, cost column, seam, default, the menu, the chair — and the facts they foreground are the facts that apparatus wanted. Its chair/no-chair distinction is close enough to this paper's warrant question that I may be re-describing a variable the source already sorted for.

The Hashemite pair carries a complete alternative explanation, stated at length in Part III, and I want it repeated here rather than left where it might be missed: the subsidy-not-rent mechanism accounts for the Transjordanian survival without reference to descent from the Prophet. The pair refutes the strong claim I was correcting. It does not establish the claim I replaced it with.

One case per position is not evidence of a position. Five cases, five categories, and the categories were built to hold them.

The split position may be a description of indirect rule rather than a discovery. That colonial powers appointed native rulers while professing religious non-interference is not news to anybody who has read a colonial history. What I claim is new is the mechanism — that the renunciation marks the boundary of what the conqueror could take, and that removing the constraint structure while preserving the office is what produced absolutism. Whether that is a finding or a re-labelling is a fair question and I cannot fully settle it.

The titled position's escape may be overstated. I have argued that property title needs no belief because it is enforced against things. But it needs a court, a registry and a police, all of which need somebody to accept their authority — so the belief has not been eliminated, only moved down a level and made harder to see. That may be the whole difference, and it may be a large one, and I cannot demonstrate which.

The Qianlong case is not a colonial seating and sits in this paper because it is too good to leave out, which is a bad reason. It bears on the credential scale rather than on

the five positions, and its inclusion makes the paper's shape less clean than its argument.

The evidence for restraint before conquest is thin in exactly the way it always is. Part IV claims the constraints on an emir fell from five to one. Establishing what constrained an emir in 1900 requires the pre-conquest record, and the pre-conquest record is thinner than the colonial one precisely because the colonial administration was the thing generating documents. The claim is plausible and is not measured.

And the deepest problem, which Part IX makes worse rather than better. If the archive's bias runs systematically against orders that resisted conquest, then the five positions are a taxonomy of what conquerors did *to the orders they successfully took* — a sample from which every order that could not be seated at all has been removed by construction. A conqueror who failed leaves a punitive expedition report and no seating document. The paperwork this paper relies on for its independence from outcomes is itself produced only by the outcomes it is trying to predict.

Part XII — The excluded, and the discipline

What the five arrangements cost, and to whom.

This project requires every study to name the people who were inside an order's coercive reach and outside its settlement. This paper owes that more than most, because its whole subject is the seating of men — and every one of the five positions is an arrangement between a conqueror and somebody's elite, made over the heads of the people the elite would then govern.

In Northern Nigeria the settlement was made with slaveholders. An empire whose public had been told the war was fought for abolition kept the aristocracy of the largest slave state on earth in place, kept their courts and their revenues, and implemented abolition as a prohibition on trading while declining to interfere with existing domestic relations. Slaves who wanted freedom bought it themselves, in six figures, at prices their owners named. The one continuous record of slave-raiding under British rule was kept by the raider — a district head Britain had confirmed in office, asked to stop, and did not depose for another seven years. And the people who rose at Satiru in 1906 and were destroyed for it were the ones who had believed the British promise.

In Kenya the cost of the forged chair was itemised on the bodies of the governed: a tax that had to be earned on another man's farm and was timed to fall due when that man needed hands; a criminal offence for leaving a labour contract; a copper container at the throat carrying an employer's written opinion, in a script most wearers could not read, which fixed a man's wage and decided whether he would be hired; a reserve filling past capacity with no lawful way out. And the Emergency at the end of it, in which the state detained, screened and hanged on a scale it took decades to concede, and then burned and sank the files.

In Mongolia the sentence that cost nothing cost something. Qianlong's decree is admired above for its economy, and its economy consisted in permanently denying a people the possibility that their own highest authority might be one of their own. That is a cheap instrument in the ledger of the empire that issued it and not in any other.

In Morocco the rented cost column means that ordinary Moroccans policed each other on the coloniser's behalf, at no charge to France, in the sincere belief that

they were discharging a religious duty. And the mountains where the borrowed robe did not reach are where that study's dead are clustered, killed by the naked sword because the rented belief did not extend that far.

And in Taiwan the manufactured proprietor was manufactured out of somebody's dispossession. A survey that resolves a doubled tenure resolves it in favour of one of the two parties, and the party swept into the losing category wholesale was the aboriginal rent-holder.

On the vocabulary. This paper has called human beings a *class*, an *elite*, a *cost column*, a *labour supply* and a *catchment*. That register is chosen because vagueness about mechanism has protected more atrocity than it has prevented, and because an efficient conquest is easier to excuse when it cannot be described. But the register makes suffering sound like a variable, and the debt should be paid explicitly at least once. The men and women who bought their own freedom in Northern Nigeria were not evidence about the shape of a settlement. Waiyaki wa Hinga died in chains on a road to the coast. And the boy identified in Tibet as the returned Jebtsundamba was a child, moved across a continent because an emperor two thousand miles away had decided that a Mongol must never again hold that office.

Legibility is not pardon. To show that a conquest was ingenious is to say something about the conqueror and nothing whatever in his defence. The gentlest of the five positions — the rented sovereign — is the one this paper calls cheapest, and cheapness here means that the conquered population paid for its own subjection in a currency the conqueror never had to spend. That is not a mitigation. It is the most refined form of the taking.

Conclusion

One problem, five answers, and the one that stopped asking.

A conqueror arrives with the only thing that is never in short supply, which is force, and discovers within a season that force is adequate to holding a country and useless for the thing he actually needs — a reason why the men he appoints will still be obeyed when he is at the coast, and why their sons will inherit. He needs a warrant. And he is the one man in the country who cannot write one, because a warrant written by a party to the contest is not a warrant but a forecast about that party's health.

The record contains five answers, and they can be told apart from the paperwork of the installation.

He can **forge** — seat a man of his own making, necessarily one his own people have cast out, and pay the difference forever in tax pressure and registration and garrison, until the difference is hanging in a copper tube around a million necks.

He can **import** — move a man who already carries something the conqueror could not have made, which is why the same empire in the same room in the same month could seat two brothers on a genealogy older than itself, and why one of those thrones is still occupied.

He can **split** — take the appointment and leave the god, announcing both in one speech because the renunciation is what makes the claim bearable, and discover that he has not preserved the institution but removed every constraint it ever had, so that the hands able to check an emir fall from five to one and the one is in London and cares about the receipts.

He can **rent** — leave a sovereign in possession of everything and run the country through his signature, cheapest and gentlest of all, and find in the end that a tenant who evicts his landlord has nowhere left to live, and must fetch the man back from Madagascar.

Or he can stop asking the question. He can **survey the land, issue the deeds and sell the bonds**, and manufacture a class whose holdings require nobody's deference, because a title deed is enforced against things and a bondholder cannot despise the government without despising his own portfolio. That is not a solution to the warrant problem. It is an escape from it, and it is the one the modern world took.

Two things follow that this project should carry.

The first is a correction to my own recent work. **Placement is not authorship.** The prohibition falls on a title whose only source is a party to the contest, and a man installed by a foreign power while carrying a warrant that power could never have issued does not fall under it, however dependent he looks. Forged and imported are different positions, and only the first is brittle by construction.

The second is darker and concerns what any of this can be known from. This project has conceded that it reads a survivorship record. The archive says something worse: that the record is a technology of the apex, and that **the property which makes an order resistant to conquest is the same property that ensures it leaves no account of itself.** The bias does not merely favour survivors. It runs against precisely the configuration the framework most wants to see. What we have, in the end, are the seating documents of the conquests that worked, written by the men who wrote them, in a genre invented by the winners for the purpose of recording their own arrangements.

And the last line belongs to the man who stated the whole framework aloud in 1903 without knowing he was doing it. Lugard did not claim that the caliphate he had just destroyed was illegitimate. He claimed it had been legitimate enough to create a title, and that the title had now passed to him. **A conqueror's only available warrant is the validity of the conquest before his own** — which is why no conqueror can afford to say that conquest confers nothing, and why the ground, in this record, is never empty.

A note on sources and scholarship

Every borrowed idea is explained in the text rather than invoked on authority; this note gives the references and the reservations.

On the case material. This paper is built on six case studies and two framework papers produced earlier in this project — *British Northern Nigeria*, *British Kenya*, *British Transjordan*, *British Iraq*, *French Morocco*, *Japanese Taiwan*, *Soviet Mongolia*, together with *The Headless Order* and *The Clerk and the Priest* — all of which carry their own full sourcing. Those studies were produced under a related but distinct framework, and the reservation in Part XI applies throughout: evidence assembled to answer one framework's questions is a compromised test of another's. Every factual assertion here about any case is established in the relevant study with its sources; the present paper contributes the reading rather than the research.

On the commitment problem and coordination. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49:3 (1995); Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91:2 (1997). The horizontal application among armed peers is this project's extension.

On Northern Nigeria. The founding of the Sokoto Caliphate by Usman dan Fodio's jihad from 1804; its structure as a confederation of emirates under a caliph, with an Islamic judiciary of *alkalis*; the battle and the fall of Sokoto in March 1903; and Lugard's address setting out the terms of British rule — including the claim of title through the Fulani conquest, the statement that all sultans and emirs would be appointed by the High Commissioner, the guarantees to the emirs' courts and revenues, and the explicit undertaking of non-interference with the Muslim religion — follow the earlier study, which quotes the address as a primary document and cites its reproduction. The administrative ratios, the arms-embargo point, the Satiru rising of March 1906, the six-figure self-purchase of freedom by the enslaved, and the district head whose slave-raiding was recorded and tolerated all follow the same study and its sourcing.

On Kenya. The Kikuyu order's *mbari*, *githaka*, *mũramati*, *riika*, *kiama* and *ituīka*; the deaths of Waiyaki wa Hinga in custody in 1892 and the rise of Kinyanjui wa Gathirimu from disowned *njaguti* to senior chief in 1908 and to the invented paramount chieftaincy; the hut tax of 1901 and poll tax of 1910, Girouard's statement

on compelling the native to leave the reserve, the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1906; the Native Registration Ordinance of 1915 enforced from 1919 with the *kipande*, the million-plus issued by 1932, and the settler revolt against universal registration in the late 1940s — all follow the earlier study and the scholarship it cites, principally Godfrey Muriuki on the pre-colonial order.

On Transjordan and Iraq. The Cairo Conference of March 1921 and the seating of Faisal in Iraq and Abdullah in Transjordan on the Sharifian principle; the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958; and the analysis distinguishing importation from illegitimacy, together with the subsidy-not-rent mechanism and the two aggravating variables carried by Iraq, follow the earlier study of Transjordan, which was written as a control case against the earlier study of Iraq. The competing explanation set out in Part III is that study's own finding and is reproduced here rather than argued against.

On Morocco. The Alaouite sultan as *amir al-mu'minin* and sharif, the *bay'a* as a contract with named signatory classes and stated undertakings, and the protectorate's dependence on the sultan's seal follow the earlier study, which notes that certain constitutional details reached it through a single reproducing source and want collation. The deposition of Mohammed ben Youssef on 20 August 1953 with the involvement of Thami El Glaoui, the installation of Mohammed Ben Aarafa, the exile to Corsica and then Madagascar in January 1954, the rising around Oued Zem in August 1955, and the sultan's return on 16 November 1955 followed by independence in 1956, were checked against the standard reference accounts for this paper.

On Taiwan. The doubled tenure of the western plain, the Qing-era land survey of 1886–89 and its "reduce four and retain six" formula, the Japanese cadastral survey and compensation of extinguished rights, and the analysis of the manufactured proprietor and the government security as binding instruments follow the earlier study and its sourcing, including Johanna Meskill's study of the Lin family of Wufeng.

On Mongolia. The office of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the Chinggisid descent of the first two holders, the rebellion of 1756 and its trigger, and the Qianlong emperor's decree of 1758 that future incarnations be found among the population of Tibet — together with the observation that by 1911 the arrangement was not experienced as foreign — follow the earlier study and its sourcing.

On the framework papers. The trade-off between reach and resilience, the account of acephalous orders drawing on E. E. Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer* (1940) and Marshall Sahlins on the segmentary lineage (1961), Ibn Khaldun on *asabiyya*, and James C. Scott's *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009), and the finding that the historical record is a technology of the apex, are from *The Headless Order*. The observation that conquerors keep the clerks and do one of a few things to the priests, worked across

Sasanian Persia, Buganda, Manchu China and Nahua Mexico, and the position-logic account of recurrence including the horizon limit, are from *The Clerk and the Priest*, which cites Richard Bulliet and Michael Morony on Persia, Pamela Kyle Crossley and Mark Elliott on the Qing, and James Lockhart and Matthew Restall on Mexico.

On the framework applied. Possession and ownership, the anchor, the floor, sole authorship of title, the interpreter class and its two functions are developed across this project's theoretical papers. The vertical and horizontal distinction used in Part IV is from *The Shape of the Sieve*; the credential-distance scale qualified in Part IX is from *The Distance to the Sword*; the claim about installed elites corrected in Parts III and IX is from *No Empty Ground*.

On what is not attempted. This paper makes no claim to original historical research in West African, East African, Levantine, North African, East Asian or Inner Asian history, all of which it enters as a visitor and in each of which it relies on this project's earlier studies and the scholarship they cite. Its contribution is analytical: to state the conqueror's problem as a single question about warrants, to set out five answers that can be distinguished from installation documents, to correct an over-broad claim this project made a short time ago, and to record a sharper statement of the archive problem than the one this project had reached. It supersedes none of the earlier papers, which are left standing as written, so that the advance remains visible as something the evidence forced.